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MONETARY STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA"
By

ALIIAJJ A. MIMED"•
Mr. Chairman,
Fellow Ban.ken,
Distinguished Ladiles and Gentlemen.

Iu8ation can also be due to non-monetary factors on the
111pply side.- The demand-centered &-Jalysi.e merely emphuises thf! potential role of money in the inflationary
proce&S.

l. l wish to expreea my delight and appreciation to the
Nigerian Institute of Bankers for the honour of inviting
me to speak on the occasion of this year'fl AnnpaJ Dinner
of your pre.stigious Institute. The topic I have chosen for
tonight's speech is, "Mooetary Stability and Econcl'ftic
Growth in Nigeria". Given our nmtual concern over recent developments in the banking syat.em and the macroeconomic considerations that mate the current restrictive
monete.ry policies necessary, I coruiider it worthwhile at
this time, to reflect on the issue of monetary stability a.nd
its place in the country's effort& towards rapid develo~
ment.

4.
A second important policy. issue arising from ~e
foregoing is the link between inflation on the one hand
and market interest rate and the exchange rate on the
other. Persistent inflation generates expectations about
the course of future prices and put.8 an upward bias on
market interest raLe as lenders seek to protect the rea.l
value of their funds. On the other hand, rising domestic
inft&t.ion relative to those of trading partners puts downward pressure on the value of the domestic currency in
terms of foreign currency.

5. It is important to point out that the fong-terlJl effect
of mor,ey stock changes oa output is generally considered
to be tenuous. The main long-te,m eff'ed of excessive
money stock growth a]ilpeare llo be a sustain.ed rise in
the price level. ,Long-term growth is generally considered
to depend on rea.l factors such as rea<Jbrce endowments,
technology, high productivity and inter-temporal choices
between present and future consumption. lt therefore follows that an appropriate target for monetary expansion
forms a.n essential part of any package of macroeconomic
policy measures. It is broadly this awareness of the importance of monetary growth and short-term economic
activity wt>ich informs the Central Bank's annual morwtary and credit targets.

2. The chaJJenge of maintaining stable monetary growth
hM been a difficult one the world oYer, due, among other
things, to the often uneasy trade--0ffs involved. In our
case, as indeed a large number of developing countries,
the task bas beeri,made complex by institutional weaknesses an the financial system, the volatility of the external secto'r, and the perennial and relatively large fiscal
deficits of the Government. Due mainly to these factors,
efforts to COJitrol the money stock in Nigeria over the
years. has met with limited succeBB. More ofttn than not,
the growth of money supply significantly exceeded policy
targets and contributed to destabilising movements in a_ggregate demand. Excessive monetary expansion, as expected, has been closely associated with rising domestic
prices and extern&!. sector imbalances.

6. The Nigerian experience confirms the earlier s1Jgg,·~tion that inflation can originate from monetary as wr-11
as non-monetary causes_ For example, the drought I hnt
affected agricultural production in the early 1970s and to
some extent in 1987 were important contributory factors
in the acceleration of prices in the periods. Besjdes, varcost increases have
ious other exogenous factors such
also conttibuted to inflation. Nevertheless, the association between monetary growth and inflation has been
remarkable in the 19708 and 1980s. By c_ontrast however, the same &trong relationship does not seem to e.xist
between monetary growth and economic growth as measured by the GJ'06S Domestic Product -(GDP).
7. ln the period since 1970, the highest average rates of
growth in the money stock were recorded in the period
1974 - 1977 arid 1977 - 1983. These two periods have
also recorded the highest average rates of inflation. The
growth of the money stock averaged 55 per cent in the
period 1974 - 1977 and 30.3 per cent during 1987 - 1988
while the inflation rate a~raged 2LO per cent iA the earlier and 24.3 per cent m the more recent sub-period. In

3. As you know, the relationship between money, output an'd prices continue to be a matter for sharp division
among economists: Nevertheless, there is a fa,ir amount
of agreement on a number of broad issues relevant for
policy. It is genera.Uy a.greed that cbariges in the money
stock impact 90 nomina.l and real inteFest rates as well
as output and prices in the short-run .. Excessive monetary growth, an line with this framewor~, is expected
to stimulate aggregate spending and cOD1equently output
expansion, provided there a.re idle l'CIMJUrces. Bolt'ever, if
output is relatively inelastic, due to technolog1cal limitations, foreign exchange constraints or Im, productivity
(which ia the rule•rather than, the exception in the Nigerian situation), monetary stimulus wo11ld tend Lo generate
infla.tionazy pre88ures as well. fllrt,hermore, an increMe
in aggregate flpending; by atimutawng imports, als.o puts
preuure on the external sedor. Conversely, if monetary
expa.ru,ion fails to keep pace with the growtb in output,
this ,lack would exert a receSBionary imp1lct on om.put
growth. The analysis does no~ necessarily imply.that excessive demand pressur~ aJone are to bl&me for inflation.
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• Being the texi or the Addre8S delivereEI at the 1989 Annual Din~er of the Niaerian Ins(iluLe or Bankel"II at (/Hotel Elm Meridien,
Victoria laland, Lagoo,
** 'Alhaji A. Ahmed i• the C.oven,or of Centl'AI BAnk of Nigeria.
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ground that the {;o.,~mment adopt.ed the re-flationary
budget of 1988. Both fiscal and monetary policieB, you
may recall, were significantly eased, and with the· lifting of
the wage freeze substantial wage increues were grwed
in many sector,s of the econom_).

lhe period before the oil boom, ( 1970 l'!t73), the avnage .
ute of monetary growth and inflat)On were both lower at
18.8 and 9.5 per cent, respectively Sim.ilar'ly, the slowdown in the average rates of growth of money stock. in the
period ( 1978-1980) to 25. 7 per cent WM accompanied by
a de-celeration in the average inAation rate to 12.8 per
cen,t. The DlOllt stable period in terms of money supply growth was the period 1981 - 1986 when monetary
growth averaaed '5.a per cent. InAation W&S at historicaUy low levels during three yea.rs cl this period but high
in 1981, 1983, and especially in 1984 due in the latter
two years to acute shortages in supply as indicat~d by
the declines in GDP. In the ID06t recent sub-period, 1987
- 1988, the •harp rise in the average rate of increase in
money stock hM been a.c-oompan.ed by a significant rise
in the average inflation rate to 24.3 per cent.

11. At the end of 1988, the resulLs of the reflationary
policies were mixed. While aggregate output u measured by GDP l'08e by e.n impressive 4.1 per cent, the
inflation NLte had climbed from 10.1 per cent at the end
of l987 to 38.3 per cent. The balance of payments, moreover, had :recorded a deficit of !12.3 billion in contrul to
the earlier year's surplus of !a 159.2 million. Furthermore,
the naira exchange rate which remained under preMnre
alil year round, recorded a depreciation of 22.7 per cent
against the U n,it,ed States dollar. The extent of the stimulus to aggregate spending was indicated by the dramatic
increase of 43.9 per cent in the money stock - against
the t rget rate of increase cJ 15 per cent.

8. The growth performance of the economy since the
19708 revealed two distirn:t trends. There WM a period
of impressive growth fr.om 1973/74 to 1977 due .mainly
to the boom in crude oil production and prices .. This
1Vas followed by a period of stagnation spanning 1978 to
1986. The GDP in fact recorded declines of 4.1 and 6.7
per cent in 1983 and 1984 while its level ,in 1986 was about
the same as five years earlier. The factors re11ponsible for
this stagnation in reai GOP in the 1980s, as everyone now
appreciates, include not only the decline in oil production
and prices bu.t the failure of the development. strategies
followed in the period before SAP. In fact, the inAationMY spiral generated largely by rapid monetary growth
distorted relative prices - including in particular, the
country's exchange ,rate.

12. These developments clearly underscored the need to
strengthen demand management measures in 1989 as part
of the efforts to restore domestic and external stability.
The stance of monetary policy for the year was therefore
one of moderate restraint aimed at: moderating inflation;
reducing pres.sure on the balance of payments; stabilising the naira exchange rate; building-up the country's
depleted external reserves; and stimulating output and
employment.
13. In line with the policy of restraint, the ceiling on
commercial and merchant banks' loans and advances was
lowered from 12.5 to 10 per cent while commercial banks'
cash ratios were raised by ooe percentage point. The
Central Bank's Minimum Rediscount Rat.e was in addition, raised by 0.5 percentage point lo 13.25. Contrary
to expectations, monetary and credit aggregates maintained their sharp upward trend while inflation continued to accelerate throughout the first quarter of 1989.
Furthermore, the naira continued to slide even after the
sharp d4iwnward adjustment that occurred following the
merger of the FEM and the autonomous markets. By the
end of the first quarter of the year, therefore, it became
apparent that the measures already put in place would be
in11.dequate to contain the domestic inflationary pressures
and the pressures on the naira exchange rate.
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9.

The major factors responsible for increases in the
money stock over the yea.rs have been inAow of foreign
excb,a11ge especially from crude oil ~xport and increases
in bank credit to both the government and the private
eectorli. Government expenditure ia particular tended to
rifle persistently, resultin11; in rap1d monetisation of crude
oil earning1, in periods of buoyan,:y and relatively large
budget deficits 6nance.d hy the banking system when oil
re-.-enues ,~ low. CoD&equ.ently, most of the years which
reoorded the bigbest and mos&. dest.&bililling incre88f!6 in
the IJ1011ey supply were those in which relatively large incre.ues occurred in both aggregate banlk credit and govetnment moaeti&ation of crude oil. earnings. From the
foregoing, it seeffilli clear that the country's experience in
the last two decades or so has lent support to the CentraJ Ba.nk.'s approach to rnonet8ly and credit regulation.
Let me now turn attention to the current monetary mea11ure1 which I believe can best- be understood against •the
background of the main developments since 1987.

14. Against this background, additional restrictions were
introduced since April. These, you will recall, included
the upward review of cash and liquidity ratios, the prohibition of foreign-guaranteed loans and the order to recall
such loan!" outst11.11ding and the increase in the capital
adequacy ratios of banks. The climax to the squeeze or
liquidity came with the Government order on the transfer
of the deposits of public sector and parastatal organisations frorn rnmmercial and merchant banks to the Central
Bank. As we fl.re all more than familiar, banks' compliance with this directive was accompanied by significant liquidily pres11urcs on a number of banks, some of
which sought for, and obtained lender-of-last resort support from thf' Cent.ml Dank. The mon('y market remained
inactive for a while as the situation unfolded, until the return of c-onfi1le11ct> especially to the interbank fund ma.rket..

W. The 1987 pack.age of fiscal and monetary policy measures in line with the objectives of th.e Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) achieved a measure of success as
resards external, and to some extent, domestic stability.
However, economic activity became sluggish in the face
o( stagnant disposable incomes and reduced agricultural
output following the drought which affected most parts of
the country. Furthermore, there was concern 'about the
acute unemployment situa.tion. H W.M against this back-
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15. I\ ;,. g;mr,-c 1o ....., &liat with the UCtfficm ,,I ,he
p,oblem ,:,; • , ,. • it eridm, tliM the objedm,o
of 11189 1 ~ paiq ...-e being acbie-1, esi-,ially
from the -oad ;a lw. Hawing .W that, allow me to

bub liaw ., far acijuoW lo the red11<:e<I level d iiq-klity, .._ ~ • eouroe o( concern·
to ..ti ol "". I m fhc ..._ 1,a..., i.e:.o jl<IOhed to a. !,eight
that tbn,al.e115 the life d U.. aoo-bank wrporat.e oector
and ,dtima&ely U.. laancial • well. Th• hu h!IJ>pened e-, thooigt, bub i...., p.ad relatively l_.raiel on
saving depooit.s. The llitnati<ia sutgests..trongly tbBt the
liquid banb ""' employing some ooll~"" -ket i><>-r
to their immedlac.e adVllll~. Thioi - all know doe,, not
augur i-ell for the future ol tl,.e economy in general 1,11d
the bankmg sector in particular. There io an urgent need
for banks to
the wide gap between their rMeol oo
.., thaL the ...,

n""""'

savings deposits and their effect.Ive .lending rllUII.
16.
I wish to reiterate that &11 import&Dt aspect of
SAP is the liberaliutiQn of the exch•M'O and trade sysLem a.na tbe gro.du.al decootrol ol th<e financial oyotem.
My view of the future io that the proceos of de-control
would be inteosified. T:t,is view is grOUJ1ded on th• belief that a deregulated syst.em is more efficient than a
system of rigid oontrolo. However, the financio:I system
easnot be left oompletely without some control. Nevertbele.,s, it is my view that the CBN would increasingly
remove the existing direct contr0ls· and rely more on i.ndir-ect co11trols. Indirect controls, by their nature, ar-e
non-'"dis-crimioa.tory -.rid· d.6 not interfere with comoeti-

tion. Cooaeq""mly, tloey ..., in the long-term inters al
ll•e bank~ syaem.

17. I wiab to emphuiae, however, Lb.at the achievemeot
of moneta,y sta.bility through the uee of indirect controll
io predicated on the acceptance o{ greater responsibility
by banks io ensuring that the game ia played accordin1
to the rules. It is my hope lh&t banks would not inadvertently operate io way• that would give credence to the
S<:epticism expr...,.d in aome quarters about the, ability ol
& free m&rket syotem to determine, for example, a •table
exchange rate and an equitable inteNlllt rfi<! structure,
consistent with priee atahility and growth objectivee.
18. It is my hope, indeed our hope, tha the indu.otry will
revjew the situation in the light o{ the oocial responsibilities tha.t devolve on u1 .. banken. Tlie banks cannot be
blamed ror all the problems ol the economy but thqy are
expected to play a constructive role to aaaure not only
the •ucuss o( the programme of economic trans(orm,..
tioo which the country h"" embarked upon, but also to
pavoe th<, ""'Y for the greater liberalisation o{ the fibancial
sy,,tem.

1'9. Once a.gain, thank you for honouring me. I wish you
all a happy evening.
A. Ahme<I, Govet11or
Central Bank d Nigeria
Lagos

